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Abstract While new generations of implantable brain computer interface (BCI)
devices are being developed, evidence in the literature about their impact on the
patient experience is lagging. In this article, we address this knowledge gap by
analysing data from the first-in-human clinical trial to study patients with implanted
BCI advisory devices. We explored perceptions of self-change across six patients
who volunteered to be implanted with artificially intelligent BCI devices. We used
qualitative methodological tools grounded in phenomenology to conduct in-depth,
semi-structured interviews. Results show that, on the one hand, BCIs can positively
increase a sense of the self and control; on the other hand, they can induce radical
distress, feelings of loss of control, and a rupture of patient identity. We conclude by
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offering suggestions for the proactive creation of preparedness protocols specific to
intelligent—predictive and advisory—BCI technologies essential to prevent
potential iatrogenic harms.
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Introduction
As implantable Brain Computer Interface (BCI) research moves rapidly ahead,
concern about its potential effects on patients’ sense of self, autonomy and identity
is growing (Klein 2015; Glannon 2016; Klein and Jeffrey 2016; Clausen 2013;
Gilbert 2015a, b; Brown et al. 2016; Hildt 2015).1 For instance, the evolution of
prosthetic limbs controlled through BCI introduces questions about body ownership,
self-image and self-understanding. To what extent does an implantable BCI device
become incorporated into a patient’s sense of self? To what degree does an
implantable BCI device intrude on the patient’s individual capacities and lead to
iatrogenic harms? BCI innovations may blur the boundaries between a patient’s
sense of identity and computerised implantable devices in unprecedented ways. BCI
technologies offer great control at the level of neural circuits, but the extent to
which this grasp on neuronal function affects the patient’s sense of control at the
psychological level is still uncharted territory (Glannon and Ineichen 2016).
Questions today about potential BCI-induced effects on patients are directly
imported from clinical data compiled from reports and studies of open-loop,
historically longer standing technologies such as deep brain stimulation (DBS). It is
unclear, however, how DBS studies translate to closed-loop BCI research
(Kellmeyer et al. 2016). With the revolution in BCI-based neural engineering on
the horizon, there is a pressing need to explore and address the potential effects of
BCIs as they may impinge on concepts of self, control and identity.
This article addresses the knowledge gap by providing data obtained from a first-
in-human clinical trial involving six patients implanted with a new generation of
predictive and advisory BCI implants (Cook et al. 2013). These artificially intel-
ligent—predictive and advisory—implants detect specific neuronal activity patterns
believed to be precursors to neuronal events, and then provide information in the
form of visual or auditory signals to help patients initiate preventative/therapeutic
1 These references are not exhaustive. A large amount of work raises concerns or suggests the possibility
of the impact of BCI on sense of identity, autonomy and self. Further work discussing these issues are
Klein et al. (2015), Clausen (2011), Glannon and Ineichen (2016), Moritz et al. (2016), Trimper et al.
(2014), Tamburrini (2009), Nijboer et al. (2013), Gilbert and Cook (2015), Clausen et al. (2017), Goering
et al. (2017), Hongladarom (2015), McCullagh et al. (2014), Kotchetkov et al. (2010), Kyselo (2013),
Hildt (2011), Abbott and Peck (2017), Jebari (2013), Vlek et al. (2012), Heersmink (2013), Lee (2016),
Jebari and Hansson (2013), Racine et al. (2017).
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responses. The first in-human trial on which this study is based, focused on epilepsy,
a neurological condition that affects more than 60 million people worldwide.
30–40% of these cases are not adequately controlled with current treatments (Kwan
and Brodie 2000). By preparing the implanted patient to anticipate a seizure, the
technology allows the patient to take precautionary steps such as taking medication
or getting situated in a safe place (Cook et al. 2013).
Methods
We explored perceptions of self-change as provided by six patients who volunteered
to be implanted with the first-in-human, experimental BCI advisory brain devices
capable of predicting epileptic seizures and to participate in our study. The trial was
conducted to provide safety and proof-of-concept efficacy data for BCI seizure
detection in patients with medically refractory epilepsy. The BCI was capable of
learning brain activity patterns from individual based on artificial intelligence
techniques (Gardner et al. 2006). A patient-designed algorithm was created
following data collection phases, during which intracranial electroencephalograms
(EEG) were performed for assessments of individual epilepsy-monitoring (Cook
et al. 2013). The BCI device was composed of two silicon implantable lead
assemblies containing eight contacts collecting intracranial EEG on patient cortical
surface (see image). The leads were connected, through the neck, to a subclavic-
ularly placed implantable telemetry unit, which was inductively recharged through
an external charging accessory (see image) (Cook et al. 2013). Wirelessly
transmitted predictive data were displayed on a hand-held personal advisory device
(see image). The trial was conducted across three clinical centres in Australia—
Austin Health, The Royal Melbourne Hospital, and St Vincent’s Hospital (Cook
et al. 2013). The BCI devices were implanted in fifteen patients overall.
We used qualitative methodological tools grounded in phenomenology to
conduct in-depth, open-ended, semi-structured individual interviews with each of
the six patients who were drawn from three Australian states, namely Victoria, New
South Wales and Tasmania.2 All interviews were conducted in English. Interviews
were based on an adapted version of the qualitative instrument first developed and
tested in Gilbert (2015a, b) and further elaborated in Gilbert et al. (2017) and
Gilbert et al. (In Press) (‘‘Appendix’’). Interviews were transcribed verbatim.
Contents were then manually coded and finally analysed by regrouping patients’
subjective experiences into common themes and clusters.
The qualitative approach allowed us to capture unique, first-person perspectives
that are not identifiable with standardized questionnaires and scales. By using
phenomenological methods, we were able to increase opportunities for finding
fundamental, patient-specific narratives and perceptions based on lived experiences
2 This study was conducted in accordance with Tasmanian Human Research Ethics Committee
regulations. Patient Consent and Minimal Risk Ethics Application Approval, entitled ‘‘(H0013883)
Implantable Seizure Advisory Brain Devices: Ethical Implications’’ is in compliance with the Tasmanian
Human Research Ethics Committee regulations. Initial ethics approval was obtained in March 2013, and
an amendment was approved on November 2014.
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(Gallagher 2003). The main findings as defined by their prominence in the
narratives are highlighted and summarized in excerpts.
Copyright 2013 Elsevier Ltd.
Reprinted from (Cook O’Brien Berkovic et al. 2013) Prediction of seizure
likelihood with a long-term, implanted seizure advisory system in patients with
drug-resistant epilepsy: A first-in-man study. The Lancet Neurology. 12(6):
563–571 with permission from Elsevier.
Results
We collected a total of six interviews: 6.25 h of in-person interview data with a
mean duration of 1:05 h from five patients, and one interview by email-
correspondence.
Three major phenomenological clusters emerged from our analysis: (a) subjective
experience of living with chronic epilepsy; (b) subjective perception of BCI-induced
sense of control; and (c) subjective feeling of BCI-effects on sense of self. These
clusters were populated by patients’ key answers and quotes (Table 1). As this was a
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qualitative study based on first-person narratives, the main results are highlighted
and given in excerpts displayed in Table 1.
When looking more carefully at phenomena reported by patients (Table 1),
especially those concerning how BCIs induced a sense of empowerment (Cluster B),
we observed that four patients experienced, in different degrees, an increased sense
of control, leading to a sense of substantial augmented confidence. Patients reported
that this confidence enabled them to act unimpeded by the constant risk of otherwise
unpredictable seizures. In this regard, the degree of control experienced appears to
be directly proportional to the degree of confidence provided by BCI implants. For
instance, Patient 1 reported: ‘‘I felt more in control when I used the device. I could
push on and do what I wanted to do’’, alluding to his new capacity to undertake
activities promoting his autonomy (e.g., playing cricket). This is further echoed by
Patient 5 who explained: ‘‘[The BCI] gave me more confidence in some respects’’.
Patient 6 also self reported: ‘‘With the device I felt like I could do anything—I can
do this—I can do everything I want to do’’. In both cases, patients explored novel
degrees of freedom of decision to accomplish new activities, as epilepsy was
Table 1 Excerpts from patients’ reported subjective experiences of using BCIs
Patient (a) Experience with chronic
epilepsy
(b) BCI-induced sense of
control and empowerment
(c) BCI effects on sense of the
self
Patient
1
‘‘Seizures interrupt my life’’. ‘‘I felt more in control
when I used the device. I
could push on and do
what I wanted to do’’.
‘‘I don’t think it changed me as
a person, but it gave me
more confidence and
control’’.
Patient
2
‘‘I’ve got to say that
[epilepsy]’s part of me’’.
‘‘[The BCI] gave me more
confidence to do things
that I wouldn’t
necessarily and normally
do’’.
‘‘[The effects are] a natural
consequence of the
development of the
algorithm’’.
Patient
3
‘‘I just kind of pretended that
[epilepsy] didn’t really exist,
I didn’t see myself as an
epileptic’’.
‘‘[The BCI] made me feel I
had no control. So I
didn’t have control over
what I was going to do’’.
‘‘[The BCI] made me feel that
I was always differents
[from] everyone not just in
the moment of the seizure
[…] I got really depressed’’.
Patient
4
‘‘It’s been part of my life now,
it’s part of [me] now’’.
‘‘I just ignore [the BCI]
anyway
I just kept on doing my
own thing’’.
‘‘I wouldn’t say the technology
was an integral part of me’’.
Patient
5
‘‘[Epilepsy] is part of me’’. ‘‘[The BCI] gave me more
confidence in some
respects’’.
Patient 5 did not report any
experiences about his self.
Patient
6
‘‘I see my epilepsy-I’ve never
liked it-it’s been an
opposition to me and it’s
caused me a lot of
depression, anguish and a lot
of teasing’’.
‘‘[The BCI] changed my
confidence, it changed
my abilities’’.
‘‘[The BCI] was me, it became
me, […] with this device I
found myself’’.
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obstructing their independence and autonomy to make decisions and act in specific
ways. Patient 2 claimed: ‘‘[The BCI] gave me more confidence to do things that I
wouldn’t necessarily and normally do’’. Patient 6 also stated: ‘‘[the BCI] changed
my confidence, it changed my abilities’’.
However, two patients did not corroborate the findings related to a post-
implantation augmented and amplified sense of control and confidence. Patient 3
reported ‘‘[the BCI] made me feel I had no control. So I didn’t have control over
what I was going to do’’. Patient 4 declared ‘‘I just ignored [the BCI signals]
anyway. […] I just kept on doing my own thing’’. Figure 1 illustrates the range of
subjective experiences reported by the six patients interviewed.
The findings also suggest that BCI devices intruded on patients’ postoperative
sense of self. Patient 3 and Patient 6 reported experiences located at opposite ends of
the continuum seen in Fig. 1. Patient 6, who perceived that her disease caused her a
‘‘lot of harm and anguish’’, reported how the implanted BCI device forecasts were
naturally integrated into her existence and became an indispensable embodied
component of her self:
Patient 6: ‘‘[The device] was like an alien at first, […] you grow gradually into
it and get used to it, so it then becomes a part of everyday, it’s there every day,
it’s there every night you go to bed and you put it in a place that it can still
read you so it’s like a teddy bear. Really it’s there and you can see it, you
know that if you open your eyes so it’s always there, it follows you through the
shower everywhere and it becomes part of you. Because that’s what it did, it
was me, it became me, […] with this device I found myself’’.
Describing her experience further, she added:
Patient 6: ‘‘It changed who that person was then and I found myself
changing… growing I suppose and it changed my confidence, it changed my
abilities – it changed how stressed I was, how well I slept, then I could make
decisions without having to worry about what might or might not happen. […]
With the device I felt like I could do anything – I can do everything I want to
do I was more capable of making good decisions – not bad decisions – because
there’s been times where I’ve made bad decisions […] I can bake safely, I can
Fig. 1 Patients’ perceptions on a continuum from radical distress, sense of loss of control and experience
of iatrogenic harm, to augmented confidence, increased sense of control and sense of self
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bath shower safely. So it gave me a new lease on life and nothing could stop
me’’.
Patient 3 reported contrasting experiences on the continuum3:
Patient 3: ‘‘I had [epileptic seizures] since I was sixteen. I pretended that they
didn’t really exist for a while. And then I was fine but I just kind of pretended
that it didn’t really exist. I didn’t really see myself as an epilectic. […] [The
BCI] made me feel like I was just sick all the time. […] It also made me feel
like I was different to everyone else […] I didn’t want to show anyone that I
have it and it was like – I only have epilepsy. […] I felt so weird all the time;
before it, I only felt strange having the seizure’’.
The experience of being implanted with a BCI advisory system drastically intruded
on the sense of self of Patient 3, making her feel constantly confronted:
Patient 3: ‘‘because it was always beeping and always red, it made me feel like
I had no control. So I didn’t have control over what I was going to do.[…] I
got really depressed. […] I had been depressed before, I’d been very
depressed, and I knew what depression was, …I knew what depression felt
[like]; ‘know I’m getting depression’, I remember how depression felt, I
remember very much what depression felt and I could feel very much exactly
the same’’.
Discussion
The experience of a radical life transformation from living with the constant
uncertainty of not knowing if and when a next adverse neurologic event will come,
to successfully managing and preventing it with the assistance of an
implantable BCI device, might first appear as a boost for patient autonomy.
However, this study with the first six patients ever tested with an intelligent BCI for
epilepsy suggests that the transformation does not necessarily bring with it only a
sense of enhanced control and continuity in daily activities, but may have the effect
of self-estrangement. Even though the number of patients enrolled in this trial is
small, and the data are qualitative and not generalizable to a larger population, the
findings are of important ethical concern and could serve to inform future clinical
applications of such devices and the research that leads up to them.
We found in our sample that intelligent BCIs were perceived as beneficial by
most patients in terms of an associated increased sense of control over their daily
activities (Patients 1, 2, 5, 6). For most patients, it seems these intelligent BCI
predictive functionalities generated changes in the perceived degree of control over
their daily life activities, rather than changes in what constituted them as a person.
However, one patient testified to strong experiences of embodied fusion of self with
the device resulting in feelings of a new postoperative identity (Patient 6).
3 Patient 3 self-reported past episodes of depression (prior to BCI implantation).
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Importantly, we found one case (Patient 3) of a patient experiencing distress and
feeling a loss of control.
The narratives of Patient 6, for example, refer to a discontinuous transition from
who she was pre-implantation to who she became after the intervention: the device
helped the patient find what she understood to be her ‘true self’. In her case, she not
only became functionally dependent on predictions of the BCI advisory system, but
the technology was incorporated into her sense of self: ‘‘it becomes part of you.
Because that’s what it did, it was me, it became me, […] with this device I found
myself’’. Therefore, for Patient 6, the BCI device became an extension of her self
and fused with part of her body: i.e., an integral component of her embodied
personal identity. As such, it affected her aspirational goals and augmented her
activities of daily living as part of the process of self-definition and self-expression.
The experiences reported by the patients also suggest that the BCI advisory
devices can induce an abrupt transition in a patient’s self-understanding as
associated with the disappearance absence of symptoms. Finding onself changed
through implantation can also result in a sense of postoperative self-estrangement. It
is important to note that postoperative self-estrangement should be distinguished by
deteriorative and restorative features (Gilbert et al. 2017; Gilbert 2017). The notion
of self-estrangement exists in association with certain common feelings of a (1) loss
of control (Patient 3 ‘‘[the BCI] made me feel I had no control’’ and (2) distorted
perceptions of one’s capacities (Patient 6: ‘‘With the device I felt like I could do
anything […] nothing could stop me’’)—the first (1) being mostly associated with a
deteriorative sense of the self, and the second (2) largely related to a restorative
sense of the self.4 It should be recognized that drawing on subjective or first-person
phenomenological accounts of how a person feels about or experiences the BCI
implant does not provide us with enough context to assess the objective accuracy of
these accounts. Self-estrangement may occur, but is not necessarily perceived by the
implanted patient (Thomson and Segrave 2017).5
With respect to restorative features of self-estrangement, some patients perceived
them as naturally occurring (Patient 2: ‘‘It is a natural consequent of the
development of the algorithm’’). The explanation for this may reside in the
experience of changed embodiment with the patient coming to feel that the device is
authentically a part of themselves. In this study, patients’ self-reports indicate that
implanted advisory devices are experienced as increasing restorative powers (i.e.,
empowerment) over the self (Patient 6: ‘‘[The device] changed who that person was
then and I found myself changing’’).
4 Postoperative self-estrangement is not necessarily a negative consequence. Capacities induced by
clinical/medical/therapeutic/neurotechnological/DBS interventions are often experienced positively by
patients as seen in the case of Patient 6. However, in some cases of patients implanted with open-loop
DBS, postoperative feelings of estrangement largely appear to be correlated with a sense of drastic
incapacity to re-identify with the previous self, which reflects an involuntary and unintentional shift in the
experience of the self (Gilbert et al 2017).
5 Families and social context are an essential measurement of how patients experience potential
estrangement, even if patients do not perceive it. Even if the patient doesn’t report feelings of
postoperative self-estrangement, their behaviour within their family and social context can show
otherwise. An extended study of ours should not only involve interviewing the implanted patients, but
also their close relatives.
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On the other hand, in terms of deteriorative features of estrangement, Patient 3
experienced feeling a loss of control; that reflect an involuntary shift in their
experience of the self. Some feelings of postoperative deterioration of the self were
associated with a sense of powerlessness, resulting in severe distress. The notion of
postoperative powerlessness has been associated with an inaptitude to overcome
some induced psychological realities, for instance Patient 3 seemed not able to
regain control of her depressive feelings. From this perspective, the prolonged
absence of the capacities to regain control may have contributed to turning
estrangement into harm (Gilbert 2015a, b). This finding supports the hypothesis that
postoperative feelings of powerlessness play a crucial role in causing iatrogenic
harm (Gilbert 2013a, 2015b).
Patient 3 presents an illustration of how the experience of having a BCI
constantly monitor, identify and translate one’s brain activities impacts the
implanted patient’s self-understanding. Sudden exposure to medical information
that predicts upcoming chronic symptoms resulted in dramatic negative conse-
quences to the self-image of certain patients. In the case of Patient 3, the
information disclosed and exposed by the device did not corroborate the patient’s
self-image and self-narrative. Patient 3 never associated herself with epilepsy: ‘‘I
just kind of pretended that it didn’t really exist. I didn’t really see myself as an
epilectic’’.
However, being constantly alerted by the machine impressed upon her the reality
of her symptoms, thus providing corroborating evidence of her disease state. This
process exacerbated her predisposition to depression; in effect, she was unable to
manage the information load returned by the device. In turn, this provoked a
dramatic clash with her self-understanding: ‘‘I felt so weird all the time, before it I
only felt strange having the seizure’’ (Patient 03).
Ethical Recommendations
The findings provide evidence useful in elaborating ethical guidance concerning
clinical protocols of BCIs. Given the current limited amount of knowledge about the
impact of BCIs on the implanted patient’s sense of identity, a first recommendation
is to encourage further research. This research should assess whether the restorative
or deteriorative effects of BCIs are a temporary phenomenon or whether they will
last for months or years. Even if some deteriorative effects progressively disappear
after a few weeks, it is still ethically imperative that patients are informed about the
transient character of the potential phenomenon.
In view of the findings, especially the case of Patient 3, our second
recommendation is that it may be permissible to decline implanting BCIs in
patients who experience preoperative self-image issues in relation to their
pathology. This recommendation should hold until better knowledge is gained
from the potential deteriorative effects of BCIs on patients. Cases where implanted
devices have a radical impact on patients’ sense of self may be significantly
correlated with key identity development periods. Wilson et al.
(2001a, b, 2007, 2010) have observed that greater changes in self-image are
Embodiment and Estrangement: Results from a First-in-Human… 91
123
associated with seizure onset during, or before, adolescence, and lesser changes in
self-image were linked with adult onset. One explanation for the latter claim is that
it may be the case that by the time adulthood is reached, the relevant patients will
have an already established sense of the self that, as such, is more impervious to
being affected (Wilson et al. 2001a, b, 2007, 2010). In this regard, the findings in the
study suggest that Patient 3 did not perceive herself as an epileptic in early
adulthood, despite experiencing seizure symptoms. In that respect, the BCI
disclosed information that did not corroborate Patient 3’s self-image and self-
narrative, which align with Wilson and colleagues’ conclusion. In parallel, in
another study conducted by one of us with 17 patients implanted with DBS devices,
it was observed that the more patients preoperatively felt alienated by their illness,
the more they experienced postoperative self-estrangement (Gilbert et al. 2017).
These findings are also further evidence that self-concept and self-image prior to
implantation are related to potential postoperative impact on patient sense of self
and identity.
Taking time to prepare patients for potential radical changes in self-image
following implantation is essential. A lack of preparedness to deal with restorative
or deteriorative outcomes could make patients and their families more vulnerable to
negative outcomes and lead to distress. Clinical preparation should focus on
introducing regulatory preoperative psychometric self-image measurements to
identify links between patient self-image and illness. These psychometric self-
image measures could prepare patients in anticipating radical self-change due to
abrupt deteriorative or restorative effects of BCIs. Limiting access to BCI
experimental trials for some patients experiencing preoperative self-image issues
in relation to their illness is a precautionary step. Given the current state of the art,
BCI experimental trials are not treatment; they are not a therapeutic intervention
within a consented study protocol. If some patients with self-image issues were to
be excluded from trials this would not deny them access to potential treatment.
Recommending exclusion of some patients from participating in experimental trials
would help to prevent relevant harms within the given experimental regimen.
Conclusion
This study provides new knowledge about the impact of novel artificially
intelligent BCI technologies on end-users. Intelligent closed-loop BCI devices can
have a radical and profound influence on patients’ postoperative sense of control
and self. However, it is still unclear how the potential effects on embodiment or the
experience of self-estrangement are caused. At this time it is relatively difficult to
isolate the cause of these potential postoperative changes, though they have been
associated with BCI implants in our study. To the best of our knowledge, no study
should claim that potential postoperative personality changes can be predicted
solely on the basis of being implanted with a BCI (Gilbert 2012; Gilbert 2013b;
Gilbert et al. 2014).
BCIs offer great potential to enhance quality of life—in particular by increasing
control over neurologic symptoms—but also involve challenges of potential
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unwanted outcomes that could make patients more vulnerable and subject to
iatrogenic harms. This is supported by the results of our interviews with six patients,
one of whom reported feelings of postoperative self-estrangement and a failure to
achieve embodied fusion of self with the device. Evidence-based preparedness
protocols specific to BCI technologies could prevent such potential harms.
Physicians and patients would benefit from decision-making frameworks for
relevant healthcare choices as developed from early ongoing experimental trials.
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Appendix: Semi-Structured Interview Script
These are examples of generic questions. They are an indication of the structure to
be followed during the interviews, rather than the actual questions to be asked to
patients. The choice of words, terminology or languages may change slightly for
each patient.6
1. Potential questions regarding postoperative sense of the self.
(a) What was it like to live without the predictive brain computer interface
device (BCI) device? Did you feel that your medical condition affected
who you were, your identity, or did you feel comfortable in yourself with
your condition?
(b) What is it like to be implanted with BCI? Do you feel any significant
difference from before the device compared to after it was implanted?
6 Based on qualitative instrument entitled ‘‘Semi-structured Interview Script’’ in Gilbert (2017).
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• If yes, please provide some examples. Did you expect to find
differences or changes to yourself prior to the operation?
(c) Would you agree with such statement: ‘‘the predictive BCI device has
changed who I am’’?
• If yes, do you interpret this change as a form of enhancement or
restoration of yourself? How?
• If no, do you view the device as an integral part of who you are?
Why?
(d) Have others commented on any changes to your ‘‘self’’ (personality)
since being implanted? If so, do you agree with them? Why or why not?
(e) Do you think that you may change/change more in the future as a result
of this intervention?
2. Potential questions regarding the sense of control.
(a) Do you feel the device has increased your autonomy (making you less
dependent on others)? For instance, has it given you back more control
over your life? For example has it improved your life, control on
symptoms, or sense of self?
(b) Prior to the implantation of this device, how would you describe your
control over your life?
(c) If you experience the BCI device as s form of control, does this ‘‘control’’
feel authentic? Do you endorse it? From your own personal experience,
do you see it as novel or restorative control?
(d) Have others commented that you have better control over your life/
symptoms/yourself? Do you agree with them? If not, why not?
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